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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43714 
      ) 
v.      ) KOOTENAI COUNTY  
      )  NO. CR 2013-20004 
CHRISTOPHER WAYNE THOMPSON, )  
      ) APPELLANT'S    
 Defendant-Appellant.  )  REPLY BRIEF 
________________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Christopher Wayne Thompson pleaded guilty to 
second-degree murder.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifty-two-years, 
with sixteen years fixed.  Mr. Thompson filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) 
motion, which the district court denied.  Mr. Thompson appealed, asserting the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion. 
 In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued the district court’s order denying 
Mr. Thompson’s Rule 35 motion should be affirmed, because the district court lost 
jurisdiction to grant the Rule 35 motion, and because Mr. Thompson did not present any 
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new evidence in support of the Rule 35 motion.  (Resp. Br., pp.2-5.)  This Reply Brief is 
necessary to address the State’s arguments, which are unavailing. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Thompson’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Thompson’s Idaho Criminal 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Thompson’s Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence  
 
 Mr. Thompson asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.  Mr. Thompson asserts 
his sentence is excessive in view of the new and additional information presented with 
the Rule 35 motion.  Specifically, Mr. Thompson presented new and additional 
information on his mental health issues and the treatment he was undergoing 
while incarcerated.   
 
A. The District Court Acted Within A Reasonable Time In Ruling On The 
 Rule 35 Motion 
 
 The State argues Mr. Thompson’s Rule 35 motion was not timely ruled upon, 
and, due to the passage of time, the district court lost jurisdiction to rule on the motion.  
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(Resp. Br., pp.2-4.)  However, the district court here acted within a reasonable time in 
ruling on the Rule 35 motion and therefore had jurisdiction. 
Under Rule 35, a district court “may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the 
filing of a judgment of conviction,” and “may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of 
probation or upon motion made within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the order 
revoking probation.”  I.C.R. 35(b).  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has held “a 
district court does not lose jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion under Rule 35 merely 
because the 120-day period expires before the judge reasonably can consider and act 
upon the motion.”  State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 354 (1992) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Rather, “if the trial court does not rule upon the Rule 35 motion within a 
reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day period, the trial court loses 
jurisdiction.”  Id.   
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held “[t]he reasonableness of any delay by the 
district court in ruling upon a Rule 35 motion must be evaluated in light of the purposes 
supporting the 120-day limitation and reasons for the trial court’s delay in each case.”  
State v. Tranmer, 135 Idaho 614, 616 (Ct. App. 2001).  The Court of Appeals has also 
held that “when a defendant files a Rule 35 motion, it will of necessity become defense 
counsel’s responsibility to precipitate action on the motion within a reasonable time 
frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and justification for delay, to avoid the 
risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction to consider the motion.”  State v. Day, 131 Idaho 
184, 186 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Here, the State acknowledges Mr. Thompson filed a timely Rule 35 motion on 
May 26, 2015, sixty-three days after the entry of judgment on March 24, 2015.  (Resp. 
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Br., p.1 (citing R., pp.255-59).)  The district court initially scheduled a hearing on the 
Rule 35 motion for July 10, 2015, before continuing the hearing to July 17, again to 
August 21, and ultimately to October 2, 2015.  (See R., p.10.)  As the State suggests 
(Resp. Br., p.3), the register of actions indicates those continuances were upon defense 
counsel’s request.  (See R., p.10.)  The district court took the matter under advisement 
following the hearing (Tr., Oct. 2, 2015, p.36, L.23 – p.37, L.4), and then issued its 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Rule 35 Motion on October 27, 
2015.  (R., pp.268-76.)  As the State has noted (Resp. Br., p.3), the district court denied 
the Rule 35 motion approximately 217 days after judgment or 154 days after the 
Rule 35 motion was filed. 
The State argues “[t]he record contains no explanation for the multiple 
continuances of the hearing on the motion, and nothing in the record justifies such a 
lengthy delay.”  (Resp. Br., pp.3-4.)  However, it could be said that the delay was 
caused in part by the retirement of the original sentencing judge.  The original 
sentencing judge retired in between the issuance of the judgment and the filing of the 
Rule 35 motion, on May 1, 2015.  (See Office of the Governor, Governor Appoints 
Coeur d’Alene Trial Court Attorney to First Judicial District Bench (May 1, 2015), 
available at https://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/press/pr2015/2%20Feb/pr_25.html.)  The 
State and the district court recognized that the district court was reviewing the 
discretionary decision of the original sentencing judge.  (See Tr., Oct. 2, 2015, p.34, 
Ls.15-17; R., pp.274-75.)   
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a district court did not lose jurisdiction 
to act upon a timely Rule 35 motion after the expiration of the 120-day period, where 
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“the delay was caused in part by the retirement of the original sentencing judge.”  
State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1984); see also State v. Simpson, 131 
Idaho 196, 198 (Ct. App. 1998) (indicating that a delay might be reasonable in a 
situation where the district judge who was sitting at the time the defendant filed a Rule 
35 motion was succeeded in office by a different judge and the latter ruled on the 
motion).  Like the original sentencing judge in Torres, the original sentencing judge in 
this case retired, which could account for part of the district court’s delay in ruling on 
Mr. Thompson’s Rule 35 motion.  If so, the Court should not “visit the consequences of 
such delay upon [Mr. Thompson].”  See Torres, 107 Idaho at 898. 
A comparison with the circumstances in Simpson may also help show why the 
district court did not lose jurisdiction to rule on Mr. Thompson’s Rule 35 motion.  In 
Simpson, the district court imposed sentence in June 1995, the defendant filed a Rule 
35 motion in August 1995, and the district court denied the motion after a hearing in 
January 1997.   Simpson, 131 Idaho at 197.  The Court of Appeals observed that, while 
“the record is silent as to the basis for the district court’s delay in deciding” the 
defendant’s Rule 35 motion, it appeared “that the district judge who was sitting at the 
time [the defendant] filed his motion was succeeded in office by a different judge and 
that it was the latter who eventually ruled on [the defendant’s motion.”  Id. at 198.   
Citing Torres, 107 Idaho at 898, the Simpson Court stated, “[u]nder different 
circumstances, this explanation might be sufficient for this Court to consider the sixteen-
month delay to be reasonable.”  Simpson, 131 Idaho at 198.  But the Court then noted 
the defendant “had almost completely served the fixed portion of his sentence and 
would soon be parole-eligible at the time the district court ruled on the motion.”  Id.  
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Under those circumstances, the Simpson Court held the district court lost jurisdiction to 
act upon the Rule 35 motion because “the court’s assertion of jurisdiction would infringe 
upon the authority of the Board of Pardons and Parole.”  Id. 
In contrast to the defendant in Simpson, Mr. Thompson was not close to 
completely serving the sixteen-year fixed portion of his sentence at the time the district 
court ruled on his Rule 35 motion.  (See R., pp.256, 275.)  Further, the total period of 
delay between the filing of the Rule 35 motion and the issuance of the district court’s 
order was only 154 days or about five months in this case (See R., pp.258, 268), as 
opposed to the corresponding sixteen-month period of delay in Simpson.  See Simpson, 
131 Idaho at 198. 
Thus, in light of Torres and Simpson, where the Idaho Court of Appeals 
recognized delay in ruling upon a timely Rule 35 motion caused by the retirement of the 
original sentencing judge may be reasonable, the district court here acted within a 
reasonable time in ruling on Mr. Thompson’s Rule 35 motion and therefore 
had jurisdiction.  The State’s argument on this issue is unavailing. 
 
B. Mr. Thompson Presented New And Additional Information In Support Of The 
 Rule 35 Motion 
 
 The State argues that, even if the district court had jurisdiction to rule upon the 
Rule 35 motion, Mr. Thompson did not establish any basis for reversal of the district 
court’s order denying the motion because he presented no new evidence in support.  
(Resp. Br., pp.4-5.)  The State contends that information on Mr. Thompson’s 
“stabilization on psychotropic medications, participation in mental health treatment and 
counseling while incarcerated, and lack of disciplinary problems while incarcerated was 
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before the district court at the time of sentencing,” and that he “has continued to be 
stable on his psychotropic medications, participate in mental health treatment and 
counsel, and not have disciplinary problems is not ‘new’ information.”  (Resp. Br., p.5.)  
However, Mr. Thompson actually presented new and additional information in support of 
the Rule 35 motion. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, 
the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional 
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).  “An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the 
presentation of new information.”  Id. 
 In this case, Mr. Thompson presented new and additional information in support 
of his Rule 35 motion regarding his mental health issues and the treatment he was 
undergoing while incarcerated in prison.  (See Tr., Oct. 2, 2015, p.7, L.22 – p.11, L.25.)  
The information cited by the State that was available at the time of sentencing instead 
pertained to Mr. Thompson’s pre-judgment mental health issues and treatment while in 
jail.  (See, e.g., Tr., Mar. 23, 2015, p.78, Ls.12-17 (“Dr. Carlberg, a dedicated 
psychiatrist, was willing to come and spend hours and hours a week in the jail and work 
on the different medications and work with me until we got [Mr. Thompson] to where he 
was stable.”).)  The State has not presented any authority for its apparent argument that 
information is not “new” if it deals with the same factors that were before the district 
court at sentencing. 
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 Further, the district court, in its order denying the Rule 35 motion, stated 
“Defendant’s rehabilitation during the short time he has been incarcerated is noted.”  
(R., pp.274-75.)  Contrary to the State’s contention, the district court characterized that 
information as “new evidence.”  (See R., p.275.)  Also, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
consistently held that evidence of a defendant’s “good conduct while in prison is worthy 
of consideration.”  See, e.g., State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 176 (Ct. App. 2004) (“This 
Court has held that although good conduct while in prison is worthy of consideration, it 
may not necessarily result in a reduction of a prisoner’s sentence.”); State v. Sanchez, 
117 Idaho 51, 52 (Ct. App. 1990) (“Sanchez also invites our attention to evidence 
presented in support of her Rule 35 motion, that she has exhibited good conduct while 
in prison.  Evidence of this kind is worthy of consideration; but as every judge knows, it 
may not be an accurate indicator of future conduct in a noncustodial setting.”) 
 Thus, Mr. Thompson presented new and additional information on his mental 
health issues and the treatment he was undergoing while incarcerated.  The State’s 
argument on this point is contrary to the district court’s own determination and Idaho 
Court of Appeals precedent, and should be rejected as unavailing. 
As discussed in the Appellant’s Brief (App. Br., pp.5-7), in view of the new and 
additional information on his mental health issues and the treatment he was undergoing 
while incarcerated, Mr. Thompson asserts his sentence is excessive. Thus, 
Mr. Thompson submits that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 






For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief, 
Mr. Thompson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate.   
 DATED this 22nd day of August, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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